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Abstract
This paper analyzes the behavior of horizontal B2B marketplaces along
the supply chain in case a vertical intermediary tries to enter by at-
tracting industry-speciﬁc buy-side and sell-side ﬁrms.
It will be shown that an entrant can only integrate all ﬁrms along the
vertical production chain in case the industry is strong buy-side dom-
inated. For the remaining scenarios we will determine diﬀerent levels
of integration for buy-side and sell-side dominated branches, in which
ﬁrms from upper stages will stay at the incumbent. Moreover, we will
show that horizontal marketplaces for MRO and other simple goods
will be driven out of the market in any case.
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1 Introduction
So far the impact of internet services has sustainable inﬂuenced on the
process of making economic decisions, especially by overcoming spatial dis-
tances, which has been often described as the 'death of distance'. Even if elec-
tronic networks oﬀer the infrastructure to interconnect market-participants,
only intermediary services can create a cyberhome for suppliers and buy-
ers. In this context we diﬀerentiate in business-to-consumer (B2C) solutions,
like ebay, and the rather unknown business-to-business (B2B) marketplaces,
which we will focus on in the following. Therefore, it is worth mention-
ing that the majority of e-commercial transactions are being made between
enterprises. In 2002 B2B represented almost 93% of all e-commerce and ac-
counted for more than 16 per cent of all commercial transactions between
ﬁrms in the United States (UNCTAD, 2004). Other studies estimate the
portion of B2B transactions at 70% to 85% of total e-commerce (Milliou and
Petrakis, 2004).
These numbers give a ﬁrst impression of the great importance of electronic
business-to-business intermediary services and stress the signiﬁcance of analy-
sis within the wide range of competing platforms. Therefore, platforms can
be grouped along their ownership-structure in independent and collaborative
marketplaces, where a consortium of participating ﬁrms from one market-
side runs the platform. Additionally, we can distinguish horizontal and ver-
tical marketplaces, where the distinctive mark refers to a platform's target.
Vertical marketplaces are primarily industry focused, serving a particular
branch, and are often established along traditional industry segments, like
the automotive or the computing and electronics industry (Popovi¢, 2002).
One example for the automotive industry is supplyon.com, where manufac-
turers, distributors, ﬁrst and second tier suppliers, buyers and development
engineers can bargain. On the other hand, horizontal marketplaces are multi-
industry and deal in indirect materials and services across industries. Ini-
tially, these marketplaces dealt in so called MRO goods (maintenance, repair
and operations), meanwhile, horizontal platforms can even be found for con-
struction materials or human resources services, like employease.com.
So far, most of economic literature concerning competing platforms has ne-
glected these diﬀerentiations and usually assumed one independent monopo-
listic vertical or horizontal marketplace challenged by a single entrant (See
Armstrong, 2005; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001; Rochet and Tirole, 2003).1 In
this approach, we will emphasize the vertical and horizontal relationship be-
tween independent marketplaces in particular. Therefore, we will especially
concentrate on the question if vertical platforms deter horizontal interme-
1Exceptions are Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2004), who stress the vertical target
in particular, Suelzle (2004) examined a scenario of diﬀerent ownership structures,
whereas Milliou and Petrakis (2004) analyzed a ﬁrm's incentive to create a private
B2B e-marketplace.
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diaries, as it has often been forecasted (Bogaschewsky and Mueller, 2002;
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2001). Thus we will examine an ideal
typical environment with one monopolistic horizontal intermediary on each
stage of the supply-chain and a vertical challenger, that tries to enter by
attracting market participants from one branch along this chain.
There is considerable literature on business-to-business platforms which deal
with the impact of two-sided (or multi-sided) markets. Rochet and Ti-
role (2003) analyze monopolistic and competing platforms, considering the
matching process between buyers and sellers as given and surpluses from
trade diﬀering for each ﬁrm of the same type. In this context, they determine
price setting for proﬁt-maximizing platforms and 'not-for-proﬁt cooperatives'
and compare these results with monopolistic and welfare-maximizing price
structures. Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2004) examine the incentive of
an independent, so called third-party intermediary to launch a new vertical
B2B marketplace in a scenario of a platform's emergence, where buyers and
sellers are previously 'unattached' and examine the more typical situation of
a market entry. On this occasion, they aim at a negative competition eﬀect
that arises from an increasing number of identical agents and contrast this
with the traditionally stressed positive network eﬀect from the two-sided na-
ture of marketplaces. Besides monopolistic and competing intermediaries for
diﬀerent pricing schemes, like group speciﬁc access fees, uniform prices, and a
two-part tariﬀ, Armstrong (2005) focuses on 'competitive bottlenecks', where
one market-side can register to diﬀerent platforms ('multi-home'). Most in
common to our paper are Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), analyzing the
entrant's strategy to avoid being deterred by the incumbent platform for in-
dependent marketplaces. Since they only deal with a positive network eﬀect,
the two-sided nature presents a 'chicken & egg' problem for the new interme-
diary, as the entrant should have a large base of registered sellers to attract
buyers and vice versa. Therefore, they introduce a strategy of 'divide & con-
quer', the entrant trying to attract ﬁrms from one market-side by subsidies
recovering the loss on the other side. In contrast to Rochet and Tirole they
stress the matching process between buy-side and sell-side ﬁrms and deal
with diﬀerent scenarios of exclusive registration ('single-home') for access
and transaction fees. Furthermore, they give an approach of 'multi-homing'.
Suelzle (2004) modiﬁed this framework for a situation of an independent in-
cumbent and a collaborative entrant, entering the market if the number of
ﬁrms belonging to the consortium is suﬃciently great. In this approach we
will adopt a few basic assumptions by Caillaud and Jullien as well, however,
we will only investigate the case of independent platforms for an exclusive
registration and an access pricing structure.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the assump-
tions of our model. Section 3 shows the benchmark model of horizontal
marketplaces in an ex-ante scenario. In Section 4 we analyze the behavior
of competing intermediaries in case a vertical marketplace trying to enter.
3
Finally, Section 5 brieﬂy concludes.
2 The Model
Creating a horizontal environment, we assume two diﬀerent branches α, β,
where all sell-side ﬁrms S and buy-side ﬁrms B belong to. Therefore we get
four diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms, each one consisting of a continuum of mass
1 and an entirely homogenous population of ﬁrms. Then each ﬁrm tries to
ﬁnd a matching partner on the other market-side, which is only possible by
registering to an electronic intermediary, moreover, trade can only take place
within the same industry. In the case of a perfect match the overall-trading
surplus is 1, with bB, bS being the shares of agents B,S on the assumption
that these shares cannot be equal, i.e. bB 6= bS and bB, bS 6= 0. If no match-
ing partner can be found proﬁts are zero.
Ex ante there exist n horizontal monopolistic intermediaries IN ('Incum-
bent') along the vertical production chain, labeled N = 1, . . . , n with n ≥ 3,
on which ﬁrms from both industries bargain. With the exception of the last
stage, each buy-side ﬁrm becomes a sell-side ﬁrm on the next stage. The
new vertical platform E ('Entrant') now intends to attract ﬁrms from both
market-sides but only from the speciﬁc industry α. On this occasion, all in-
termediaries compete in access prices Pk = {pBk , pSk }, k = IN , E which can be
negative representing a subsidy. The marginal costs of running an electronic
marketplace are constant and assumed to be zero, participating ﬁrms will
not have additional costs except for access prices. Then, on each single stage
the (expected) proﬁt for an agent i out of branch µ, with i, j = {B,S} i 6= j
and µ, λ = {α, β} µ 6= λ, consists of the proportional share of participating
ﬁrms from the other market-side2, the own share from trade and the access
price that has to be paid for registering at k, i.e. pii,µk = x
j,µ
k · bi − pik ∀i, µ.
Due to a lack of reputation, buy-side ﬁrms have to observe as a necessary
condition for their own participation that sell-side ﬁrms have been already
registered with E on the same stage. Moreover, sell-side ﬁrms will only reg-
ister with E after having had positive experience as a buy-side ﬁrm with the
entrant, which is related to a higher proﬁt at E.3 This induces that a verti-
cal marketplace has to attract ﬁrms from both market-sides on the previous
stage to get the chance of integrating ﬁrms from the next stage. But even
if E tries to capture all ﬁrms of branch α, the entrant will also run a non
completely-vertical integrated platform whenever proﬁts are non-negative,
which prevents free-riding by incumbents on lower stages. Additionally, ﬁrms
will choose the incumbent in case proﬁts are non-negative and identical at
2This share gives the probability to ﬁnd a matching partner, which represents the
positive network eﬀect on two-sided markets.
3As sell-side ﬁrms on N = 1 will never be able to bargain on the other market-side,
these ﬁrms will only decide along their proﬁts.
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both intermediaries E, IN . Furthermore, agents have positive beliefs in IN
concerning the participation of ﬁrms from the other market-side whenever it
is rational for them to do so.4
In the following we will analyze the behavior in a multistage-game: ﬁrst the
entrant sets access prices, whereon the incumbents will react sequentially in
the following periods using the same pricing instrument. Finally, buy-side
and sell-side ﬁrms will opt for a platform in the same order.
3 Ex ante Case
In a scenario with n horizontal monopolist intermediaries along the supply
chain, platforms will sequentially set access prices, starting on stage N = 1.
Hence, buy-side and sell-side ﬁrms have the choice between staying out of the
market or doing trade on their appropriate markets. With positive beliefs,
all ﬁrms will register to their platforms as long as overall proﬁts do not
become negative. Therefore, an intermediary does not only try to capture
the surplus of participating ﬁrms on its stage, it will also try to include the
gains from buying goods on the previous stage in the case of sell-side ﬁrms
and the expected sell-side proﬁts from buy-side ﬁrms on the next stage, if
N − 1 and/or N + 1 exist. Figure 1(a) gives a graphic overview for N = 2.
Consequently, before any platform can observe prices of other marketplaces,
each intermediary's pricing strategy can be formulated for buy-side ﬁrms as
pBIj = b
B
j + b
S
j+1 = 1, pBIn = b
B
n (1)
and for sell-side ﬁrms as
pSIj+1 = min{bBj + bSj+1 − pBIj , bSj+1}, pSI1 = bS1 (2)
with j = 1, . . . , n − 1 and bi1 = bi2 = . . . = bin = bi ∀i, in which pSIj+1 ≤
bSj+1 guarantees the participation of a sell-side ﬁrm, whenever such a ﬁrm
was registered as a buy-side ﬁrm on the previous stage.5 Anticipating the
behavior of the following intermediaries, conditions (1) and (2) lead to access
prices given in ﬁgure 1(b).
Apparently, the entry deterrence of a vertical intermediary is most expensive
for the monopolist on N = 1 and relatively cheap on the last stage N = n,
as proﬁts from industry β can always be realized.
4Without the assumption of positive or negative beliefs, there are two Nash-
equilibriums where all or no ﬁrms will participate. Thus only positive beliefs guarantee
even in the case of positive access prices the ﬁrst equilibrium, whenever proﬁts are
non-negative.
With negative beliefs, ﬁrms would only register when access prices are non-positive.
Hence, intermediaries' proﬁts would become zero or surplus could only be acquired
by transaction fees, which will be excluded in our framework so far.
5Since losses can be compensated as a sell-side ﬁrm on j + 1, an access price pBIj can
be greater than a buy-side ﬁrm's share bB on stage j.
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Figure 1: Monopolistic intermediaries
4 Competing intermediaries
Using the instrument of access prices we will start on the last stage N = n,
on which In reacts on E′s access prices and additionally on the behavior of
all other horizontal marketplaces which were also stimulated by E′s pricing
strategy.
Assuming that E attracted all sell-side and buy-side ﬁrms on all previous
stages, In intends to defend its market-share by being more attractive for
buy-side and sell-side ﬁrms on N = n in branch α by oﬀering a non-lower
proﬁt. Due to their participation ex ante, it is always rational for buy-
side ﬁrms and sell-side ﬁrms to expect xSIn = 1 and xBIn = 1, respectively.
Therefore, piB,αIn ≥ pi
B,α
In
yields pBIn ≤ pBE + bB, which leads together with
pBIn ≤ bB to
pBIn ≤ min{pBE + bB, bB}. (3)
Combining piS,αIn ≥ pi
S,α
In
with pSIn ≤ 1− pBE and pSIn ≤ bS , which corresponds
to condition (2), yields for the other market-side
pSIn ≤ min{pSE + bS , bS , 1− pBE}. (4)
If conditions (3) and (4) hold, it is rational to assume that all ﬁrms on stage
n from industry α will not register with marketplace E, i.e. xi,αIn = 1 ∀i.
Because of lacking alternatives and facing a non-negative proﬁt at In, all the
other ﬁrms from industry β will register with the horizontal marketplace, i.e.
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xi,βIn = 1 ∀i, and so the incumbent's proﬁt can be formulated as
piIn = 2 · (min{pBE + bB, bB}+min{pSE + bS , bS , 1− pBE}). (5)
Whenever E was not able to capture buy-side ﬁrms on N = n − 1, IN will
set prices along conditions (1)and (2) and makes a proﬁt of bB +min{1 −
pBIn−1 , b
S
In
}.
Under the assumption that buy-side ﬁrms have been vertically integrated
on all previous stages, we can similarly formulate for all absolutely symmet-
ric stages l = n− 1, . . . , 2
pBIl ≤ min{pBE + bB, 1} (6)
pSIl ≤ min{pSE + bS , bS , 1− pBE}
which diﬀers to N = n only in the fact, that Il will try to capture the overall
surplus 1 from each buy-side ﬁrm. Hence we obtain
piIl = 2 · (min{pBE + bB, 1}+min{pSE + bS , bS , 1− pBE}). (7)
Observing that buy-side ﬁrms have been only registered with Il−1, a hori-
zontal marketplace Il will follow conditions (1) and (2) as well.
Finally, due to the absence of a previous marketplace I1 will always set
prices
pBI1 ≤ min{pBE + bB, 1} (8)
pSI1 ≤ min{pSE + bS , bS}
and realizes a proﬁt of
piI1 = 2 · (min{pBE + bB, 1}+min{pSE + bS , bS}). (9)
Turning to E's perspective, capturing ﬁrms from branch α requires to set
prices pBE , pSE , which make ﬁghting along conditions (5), (7) and (9) unattrac-
tive for incumbent marketplaces and still guarantee a positive proﬁt for E.
Such a boundary, which will preserve E from entry deterrence, is given by
IN
′s proﬁt as a monopolist for branch β, which can be taken from ﬁgure
1(b).
Consequently, E has to start on the ﬁrst stage, otherwise he will not be able
to integrate the market participants in the following stages. Additionally,
starting on N = 1 follows the development of E′s pricing conditions: since
deterrence is most expensive for I1, vice versa, it will be relatively cheap for
E to attract ﬁrms from stage N = 1, which leads to a ﬁrst constraint. For
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N = 2, . . . , n − 1 it will be more expensive for E to attract ﬁrms. Hence,
whenever there exists a pricing condition for N = l that still leads to a posi-
tive proﬁt for E it will fulﬁll the ﬁrst constraint as well. This logic generally
holds up to the last stage.6
In the following we will focus on sell-side domination ﬁrst, i.e. bB < bS , and
analyze each case of E′s price-setting options separately.
Case 1: pBE ≥ 0 and pSE ≥ 0
Whenever E tries to attract ﬁrms from all n stages, it is rational to assume
that ﬁrms will only register as long as proﬁts are non-negative, which results
in access prices that cannot be greater than the ﬁrms' surplus from trade, i.e.
pBE ≤ bb, pSE ≤ bS . For bB < 12 we can consequently formulate piI1 < 1 + bS
as
pBE < −
1
2
+
1
2
bS (10)
which will never be fulﬁlled for pBE > 0 and bS < 1. However E could
consider a price setting of pBE > bb, which will only exclude the integra-
tion of buy-side ﬁrms from N = n, intending the integration of ﬁrms from
lower stages. Nevertheless this will not be rational either, as we obtain for
pBE²(b
B, bS ] condition (10) and for pBE²(bS , 1] expression 2 · (1+ bS) < 1+ bS ,
which cannot be fulﬁlled as well. Therefore we have to exclude the case of
positive access prices.
Consequently, we will analyze the cases of a negative price, namely a subsidy,
and a positive price for the other market-side in the following.7
Case 2: pBE > 0 and pSE < 0
As in the ﬁrst case piI1 < 1 + bS can be simpliﬁed and yields
pSE <
1
2
bS − 1
2
− pBE . (11)
It can easily be seen that subsidizing sell-side ﬁrms will not be proﬁt maxi-
mizing for E, as the amount of a sell-side subsidy had to be greater than the
positive access fee for buy-side ﬁrms and leads to the exclusion of a sell-side
subsidy. Therefore, we have to examine the last case of a buy-side subsidy.
Case 3: pBE < 0 and pSE > 0
Simplifying piI1 < 1 + bS results in
pBE < −
1
2
bB (12)
6Later on it will be seen, that there exist some scenarios, in which a previous condition
will fulﬁll a constraint for N = n as well.
7Paying a subsidy to both market-sides will also fulﬁll piIN < piMIN with pi
M
IN
being the
monopolist proﬁt, however this cannot be a proﬁt maximizing strategy for E.
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as a necessary condition for E. In this scenario, the highest possible proﬁt
for E writes as piE = pBE+pSE = 1− 32bB with pBE<≈ −12bB (<≈ meaning 'slightly
smaller than') and pSE = bS , which will be positive indeed. Capturing ﬁrms
from the following stages l requires piIl < 1, which yields
pBE < −
1
2
. (13)
If (13) holds, it is obvious that such a subsidy fulﬁlls conditions (12) as
well, and so attracting ﬁrms from stages 1, . . . , n − 1 results in a proﬁt of
(n−1) ·(12−bB) > 0 with pBE<≈ −12 and pSE<≈ bS .8 For the last stage, piIn < bB
leads to pBE < 12bB − 1 and a maximum proﬁt of n · (−12bB), which will be
deﬁnitely negative.
Finally, we have to compare the two diﬀerent levels of possible proﬁts, given
from the third case. Therefore it will only be rational for E to integrate
stages N = 1, . . . , n− 1 whenever (n− 1) · (12 − bB) > 1− 32bB holds, which
leads to a boundary of
bB <
3− n
5− 2n (14)
that will satisfy bB < 12 ∀n at all.
Proposition 1 In a scenario of a sell-side dominated branch, a vertical
marketplace can never integrate all ﬁrms along N = 1, . . . , n. Moreover posi-
tive proﬁts are only possible in the case of a buy-side subsidy: For bB ≥ 3−n5−2n
the entrant will only attract ﬁrms from N = 1 with pBE<≈ −12bB and pSE = bS
('single integration'). Otherwise, all ﬁrms from N = 1, . . . , n − 1 will be
vertically integrated with pBE<≈ −12 and pSE<≈ bS ('partial integration').
In the following we will turn to a buy-side dominated industry, i.e. bS < bB,
and examine the same pricing strategies as in the sell-side case.
Case 1: pBE ≥ 0 and pSE ≥ 0
Using equation (9) we can formulate piI1 < 1 + bS as
min{pBE + bB, 1} <
1− bS
2
. (15)
Therefore the left-hand side of condition (15) requires a negative value of pBE ,
which contradicts our assumption and leads to the exclusion of two positive
access fees.
8Note that pSE has to be slightly smaller than bS . With pSE = bS sell-side ﬁrms from
stages l = 2, . . . , n− 1 could not be captured by E, as proﬁts were the same between
E and Il.
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Case 2: pBE > 0 and pSE < 0
In this scenario we have to examine diﬀerent levels of buy-side-prices sepa-
rately.
2.1: 0 < pBE ≤ bS
Simplifying piI1 < 1 + bS leads to
pSE <
1
2
(bS − 1)− pBE (16)
which requires a subsidy that has to be greater than the positive access fee
on the other market-side and, consequently, implies a negative proﬁt for E.
Hence, we can exclude a low level of pBE as well.
2.2: bS < pBE ≤ bB
Starting on N = 1 yields for piI1 < 1 + bS
pSE < −
1
2
(1 + bS). (17)
Taking the maximum amount of pBE = bB, we obtain a proﬁt of 12(1− 3bS),
which will be positive for bS < 13 . Hence, an integration of ﬁrms will never be
possible for bS²[13 , 12) by using this pricing scheme. Alternatively, the entrant
will try to capture the following stages with piIl < 1 which induces
pSE < −
1
2
− bS . (18)
It is obvious, that this subsidy will fulﬁll condition (17) as well, hence, the
maximum proﬁt can be written as (n − 1)(12 − 2bS) which will be positive
for bS < 14 . Consequently, the entrant can only integrate stage N = 1 for
bS²[14 ,
1
3), whereas an integration of upper stages will be possible for bS < 14 .
Assuming that the sell-side ﬁrms' share is less than 14 , we will focus on the
last stage, which induces piIn < bB as a strategy for E, i.e.
pSE < −
1
2
(1 + bS). (19)
It can easily be seen that this term corresponds to condition (17), conse-
quently condition (18) leads automatically to an integration of all ﬁrms along
the vertical production chain and a maximum proﬁt of n · (12 − 2bS). On the
other side E can set a smaller subsidy, following condition (17), and integrate
only ﬁrms from the ﬁrst stage, which is related to a proﬁt of 12(1 − 3bS).9
The comparison of these proﬁts shows, that an integration of all ﬁrms will
only be proﬁtable for bS < n−14n−3 , which will be smaller than 14 for all n ≥ 3.
9Even if condition (17) is equivalent to condition (19), ﬁrms will only register on
N = 1 with the entrant. Due to a lack of reputation all agents from N = n will not
participate, as ﬁrms from stages N = 2, . . . , n− 1 will deﬁnitely not register with E.
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Hence we can summarize our results from this subcase as follows: for bS²(0, n−14n−3)
E will integrate all ﬁrms, for bS²[ n−14n−3 , 13) the entrant will only attract ﬁrms
from the ﬁrst stage and for bS²[13 , 12) no integration will take place.
2.3: pBE²(bB, 1]
The assumption of an access price pBE > bB excludes automatically the par-
ticipation of buy-side ﬁrms on the last stage. Nevertheless such a pricing
scheme could be rational as positive access prices become greater.
Focusing on the ﬁrst stages N = 1, . . . , n − 1 results in conditions (17) and
(18). Even buy-side ﬁrms will never register with E on the last stage, we
have to examine sell-side ﬁrms' behavior on N = n, as these ﬁrms opt for
trading on In or getting the subsidy on E. On the other side, In will only be
interested in ﬁrms from branch α if proﬁts are greater bB, which will never
be fulﬁlled if pSE < −12(1+bS) holds. As this condition corresponds to (19) it
is obvious that E has only two options: attracting ﬁrms from the ﬁrst stage,
which results in a proﬁt of 12(1 − bS) or deciding for a sub-integration with
ﬁrms from N = 1, . . . , n − 1 and unintentional sell-side ﬁrms from the last
stage, which leads to a proﬁt of n(12 − bS)− 1.
By the comparison of these proﬁts we obtain a critical boundary of n−32n−1 , con-
sequently E will decide for a sub-integration if bS²(0, n−32n−1) holds, whereas
the entrant will single integrate on N = 1 in a case of bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12).10
Case 3: pBE < 0 and pSE > 0
Finally we have to determine a subsidy for N = 1 by satisfying piI1 < 1+ bS ,
i.e.
pBE <
1
2
(bS − 1). (20)
With pSE = bS the maximum proﬁt will amount to 12(3bS − 1), which will
only be positive for bS > 13 .
Going forward, we obtain for piIl < 1 a necessary subsidy of pBE < −12 , which
will never lead to a positive proﬁt as sell-sides ﬁrms' surplus is less 12 .
From cases 2.2, 2.3 and 3 the new intermediary attained several strate-
gies for making a positive proﬁt within bS²(0, 12). The comparison of these
options gives ﬁnally the rational choice of E.
Proposition 2 In the case of a buy-side dominated industry a vertical mar-
ketplace can integrate diﬀerent levels of production stages. Whenever the
number of vertical stages is suﬃciently small (n ≤ 4), the entrant will run a
full-integration for bS²(0, n−14n−1), otherwise for bS²( n−14n−1 , 12) only ﬁrms from
N = 1 will be attracted ('single-integration'). In a scenario of n ≥ 5 the en-
trant has the choice between three proﬁt-maximizing strategies: (1) for bS < 1n
10In a situation of three vertical production stages there exists only one case of a
single-integration and we have to write the interval as bS²( n−3
2n−1 ,
1
2
).
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all ﬁrms will participate with E ('full-integration'), (2) for bS²[ 1n , n−32n−1) E will
integrate ﬁrms from N = 1, . . . , n − 1 with the acceptance of the participa-
tion of sell-side ﬁrms from the last stage ('sub-integration') and whenever the
demand-sided domination is quite small, i.e. bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12), only ﬁrms from
the ﬁrst stage will register with E ('single-integration').
In a case of a single integration E sets pSE<≈ −12(1 + bS), pBE = 1 and
earns piE<≈ 12(1 − bS), for a sub-integration E′s pricing scheme writes as
pSE
<≈ −12 − bS, pBE = 1 associated to a proﬁt of piE = n(12 − bS) − 1 and
for a full-integration the entrant sets pSE<≈ −12 − bS, pBE = bB, leading to
piE = n(12 − 2bS).
The proof of proposition 2 is relegated to the appendix.
Finally ﬁgure 2 combines the results for both types of domination. It can be
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Figure 2: Optimal levels of integration
seen that horizontal marketplaces on lower stages, like platforms for MRO
goods, can never defend their market-shares, as ﬁghting will be relatively ex-
pensive. Moreover, the lower the one-sided market-power, the more diﬃcult
it becomes to integrate platforms for intermediate products. This general re-
sult holds symmetrically for both sides of domination, even a full-integration
is only possible in a demand-side dominated branch.
As described before, an intermediary on N = 1 can always realize a proﬁt of
1+bS , which represents simultaneously the intermediary's opportunity costs
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in the case of ﬁghting. Consequently the expected proﬁts from ﬁghting have
to be suﬃciently high, which could never be fulﬁlled in our model. Therefore
a vertical marketplace can always earn a positive proﬁt by its entry, which
is in a sharp contrast to recent literature (like Caillaud and Jullien, 2001)
concerning access pricing schemes, where an entrant could not attract any
trade in general. These results occurred as an incumbent had only an all-or-
nothing decision between staying out of the market, related to a zero proﬁt,
or defending its market-share by access prices, intending to realize a positive
proﬁt. Meaning that opportunity costs became zero too, this made ﬁghting
very attractive and resulted in a credible strategy of entry deterrence. Our
model could not create such a credible threat in general as an incumbent had
only an all-or-partial decision. Most likely we yield a comparable result for
the last stage, where an incumbent can only realize a relatively small proﬁt.
Even opportunity costs of bB are still greater than a zero proﬁt, this case
illustrated the extreme diﬃculty for E to drive In out of the market, which
would be only possible by a strong increase in subsidies, that would make
ﬁghting unattractive for In. But even if E can ﬁnd prices that attract trade
on the last stage, it will be rational for him to attract only the lower stages
as the diﬀerence of buy-side and sell-side ﬁrms' share of trade decreases.
For the demand-side domination this can be explained as follows: ﬁrst it
is obvious, that subsidizing sell-side ﬁrms must be cheaper than subsidizing
buy-side ﬁrms, as sell-side ﬁrms' surplus is relatively small. Consequently,
this is the easiest way to attract sell-side ﬁrms as bS is at a low level. Nev-
ertheless, this is only one eﬀect. The second eﬀect, which is more diﬃcult,
occurs from the diﬀerent levels of opportunity costs; if bS adjusts to 12 from
the left side, I1′s proﬁts will increase, which makes it very cheap for E to
attract ﬁrms from the ﬁrst stage. Therefore an additional quantity eﬀect by
integrating ﬁrms from stages 1, . . . , n cannot compensate the loss from the
ﬁrst stage. Otherwise, if bS decreases, it is obvious that all opportunity costs
adjust to 1. Consequently, an integration of the ﬁrst stage becomes more ex-
pensive for E, which makes low-price strategies attractive, as the additional
ﬁrms compensate the decreasing revenue per ﬁrm. As a full integration im-
plies a buy-side price of pBE ≤ bB, the entrant has to decide between this
boundary or a maximum price of 1, which can only be paid by buy-side
ﬁrms from lower stages. On the other side, it could be shown, that pBE = 1
is always associated with a sell-side subsidy, which will even be captured by
sell-side ﬁrms from the last stage. Hence, the entrant will only run such a
strategy, if the number of stages is suﬃciently great (n > 4). Otherwise, the
loss on the last stage by this sub-integration would be greater than the loss
of a lower price pBE ≤ bB, which will even attract buy-side ﬁrms from the
last stage. But even for n > 4 there exists a boundary of bS = 1n where dif-
ferences between incumbents' proﬁts are suﬃciently small. Symmetrically,
this leads to a relatively high level of bB, which induces only a small shift
from 1 to bB. Then the additional integration of buy-side ﬁrms on the last
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stage compensates this loss and generates a higher proﬁt. Concentrating on
an increasing level of bS within the interval [ 1n , n−32n−1) demonstrates, that a
single integration of N = 1 is not cheap enough. On the other side, the
diﬀerence between a buy-side price of 1 and a buy-side price of bB is to great
to be compensated by the integration of ﬁrms from N = n. For n ≤ 4 there
does not exist such an interval, as the quantity eﬀect of integrating the last
stage will always overcompensate for the smaller revenue per buy-side ﬁrm.
Consequently, we can summarize that the second eﬀect, which explains the
impact of diﬀerent opportunity costs, induces diﬀerent intervals of optimal
behavior from E′s point of view. The ﬁrst eﬀect of decreasing subsidies at
lower levels of bS only strengthens the total eﬀect. It will be seen, that this
does not hold for a sell-side dominated branch. In such a case, the entrant
will focus on a buy-side subsidy, as buy-side ﬁrms' surplus becomes smaller
with a higher level of bS . On the other side, there still exists the second
eﬀect, caused by the opportunity costs. As before, these opportunity costs
increase with bS , which makes it very cheap for E to attract ﬁrms from
the ﬁrst stage. Consequently, we could expect from this eﬀect, that E will
not be interested in attracting ﬁrms from upper stages, as the diﬀerence
of opportunity costs between the ﬁrst stage and all other stages increases.
Nevertheless, this second eﬀect only dominates for bS ≤ 2−n5−2n , in all other
situations the ﬁrst eﬀect does. But even then the entrant will not be able to
integrate the last stage, as In′s proﬁt is falling, whereas Il′s proﬁts are con-
stant at 1. Hence, the situation between E and the incumbent In resembles
for a decreasing level of bB more and more the basic model from Caillaud
and Jullien, who have already shown that an entrant cannot attract trade
by access prices. In consequence, if the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, it will only
lead to a partial integration of stages 1, . . . , n− 1.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the behavior of horizontal marketplaces whenever a
new vertical marketplace tries to enter and monopolize one branch along the
supply chain. It could be seen, that even with positive expectations towards
the participation with incumbent platforms the entrant cannot be deterred at
all stages by access prices. This result even occurred without changes in the
network eﬀects due to a diﬀerent ownership structure. The main diﬀerence
to recent analysis constitute opportunity costs, which can be softened in our
model, as horizontal marketplaces have always the alternative on focussing
the non-attracted industry.
Nevertheless, our approach made clear that industry speciﬁc marketplaces
will not appear for all branches as it has often been predicted. A vertical
integration in the sense of a full participation of all ﬁrms from one branch will
only be rational in a strong buy-side dominated branch, moreover, the more
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complicated a product becomes, inducing more production stages, the more
this buy-side domination has to increase. On the other side, we observed that
an entrant will never be deterred on the ﬁrst stage, and so we can expect a
strong competition for platforms on lower stages, like for MRO goods, where
most platforms have a horizontal setup up to now.
In general, we can expect for a great number of stages within the supply
chain a combination of branch solutions and non-industry speciﬁc horizontal
platforms.
However, these results have to be examined under diﬀerent conditions in
future research. Therefore, this framework could be extended by a more
diversiﬁed pricing scheme including transaction-fees. Additionally, a non-
exclusive registration ('Multihoming') could be investigated. In this context
our model might even represent a framework for the adoption of diﬀerent
ex-ante structures like exclusive marketplaces owned by demand-side ﬁrms
on last stages and give an approach for the explanation of solutions that
apply under such circumstances.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
In a buy-side dominated situation, we obtain from case 2.2 three intervals:
bS²[13 ,
1
2) leading to piE = 0 (2.2.1), bS²[ n−14n−3 , 13) with piE = 12(1 − 3bS)
(2.2.2) and bS²(0, n−14n−3) associated to a proﬁt of piE = n(12 − 2bS) (2.2.3).
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From the third subcase 2.3 we already know, that the entrant can realize
for bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12) a proﬁt of piE = 12(1 − bS) (2.3.1) and for bS²(0, n−32n−1) a
proﬁt of n(12 − bS)− 1 (2.3.2). Finally, the third case leads for bS²(13 , 12) to
1
2(3b
S − 1) (3.1) and for bS²(0, 13 ] to a zero proﬁt piE = 0 (3.2).
In the following we will start with the comparison of the two subcases 2.2
and 2.3. It can easily be seen, that n−32n−1 will only be smaller than n−14n−3 for
n ≤ 5. Therefore we we will concentrate on n = 3 ﬁrst, so E has to com-
pare the proﬁt of (2.2.3), (2.2.2) and (2.2.1) with the only alternative of
(2.3.1).11 For bS²(0, n−14n−3) we yield from (2.2.3) and (2.3.1) a boundary of
n−1
4n−1 , where the entrant will integrate all (three) stages for bS²(0, n−14n−1) and
for bS²[ n−14n−1 , n−14n−3) only the ﬁrst stage. Turning to bS²[ n−14n−3 , 13) we obtain
from (2.2.2) and (2.3.1) the solution of a single integration along (2.3.1)
either. In the range of bS²[13 , 12) it becomes ﬁnally clear, that E will always
decide for (2.3.1) as (2.2.1) oﬀers only a zero proﬁt. Hence we can summa-
rize for n = 3 that E will decide for (2.2.3) in a situation of bS²(0, n−14n−1) and
for (2.3.1) whenever bS²[ n−14n−1 , 12).
In a scenario of n²{4, 5} we attain from subcase 2.3 the two alternatives of
(2.3.1) and (2.3.2) that we have to compare with (2.2.3), (2.2.2) and (2.2.1).
For bS²(0, n−32n−1) we yield from (2.2.3) and (2.3.2) bS < 1n as a condition for
a full integration, following (2.2.3). As 1n > n−32n−1 always holds for n ≤ 4, the
entrant will integrate all stages within bS²(0, n−32n−1) for n = 4. For n = 5 a
full integration takes only place for bS²(0, 1n), in the interval of bS²[ 1n , n−32n−1)
E will decide for a sub-integration along (2.3.2) instead. Continuing with
bS²[ n−32n−1 ,
n−1
4n−3) results for (2.2.3) and (2.3.1) in the same boundary of n−14n−1
as before, which will only be within [ n−32n−1 , n−14n−3) for n = 4. For n = 5 n−14n−1
will be smaller than n−32n−1 and so E′s rational choice will always be (2.3.1),
whereas the entrant will decide for (2.2.3) in the case of bS²[ n−32n−1 , n−14n−1) and
for (2.3.1) whenever bS²[ n−14n−1 , n−14n−3). In the interval of bS²[ n−14n−3 , 13) we turn
now to situations (2.2.2) and (2.3.1), which show that a single integration
along (2.3.1) will always be more proﬁtable. Finally, for bS²[13 , 12) E will
even decide for (2.3.1), as (2.2.1) oﬀers only piE = 0. Combining these so-
lutions results for n = 4 in a full integration for bS²(0, n−14n−1) and a single
integration for bS²[ n−14n−1 , 12) along (2.3.1), which is completely symmetrical
to the scenario of n = 3. For n = 5 we yield a more diversiﬁed solution:
for bS²(0, 1n) E will full integrate (2.2.3), for bS²[ 1n , n−32n−1) the entrant will
decide for a sub integration (2.3.2) and in a scenario of bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12) for a
single integration of N = 1 (2.3.1).
In the next step we are extending the scenario to n²{6, 7, 8}, as n−32n−1 is
not greater than 13 for these numbers of stages. Hence, we have to com-
pare (2.2.3) and (2.3.2) within bS²(0, n−14n−3) ﬁrst, which leads to a bound-
11As the situation of (2.3.2) does not exist for n = 3, we have to understand (2.3.1) as
bS²( n−3
2n−1 ,
1
2
).
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ary of 1n again, that will always be smaller than n−14n−3 . Thus we can con-
clude that E will full integrate (2.2.3) for bS²(0, 1n) and follow the strategy
of a sub-integration (2.3.2) for bS²[ 1n , n−14n−3). Continuing in the range of
bS²[ n−14n−3 ,
n−3
2n−1) gives the entrant the opportunities of a single or a sub inte-
gration. As we yield from (2.2.2) and (2.3.2) a critical boundary of n−32n−3 ,
which will be deﬁnitely greater than n−32n−1 , E will always opt for a sub inte-
gration if bS²[ n−14n−3 , n−32n−1) holds. In the interval of bS²[ n−32n−1 , 13) E can only
choose between the two types of a single integration along (2.2.2) and (2.3.1).
Hence it becomes obvious that a proﬁt of piE = 12(1− bS), related to (2.3.1),
will be greater than the alternative of piE = 12(1−3bS) and so the entrant will
decide for (2.3.1). Finally for bS²[13 , 12) E will even choose (2.3.1) as (2.2.1)
leads just to a proﬁt of zero. Summarizing for n²{6, 7, 8}, shows that results
will not diﬀer from n = 5, i.e. for bS²(0, 1n) the entrant will full integrate
(2.2.3), for bS²[ 1n , n−32n−1) E′s strategy becomes a sub integration (2.3.2) and
for bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12) only the ﬁrst stage will be integrated (2.3.1).
Finally we have to examine situations of n ≥ 8, where n−32n−1 becomes greater
1
3 . It can easily be seen that the ﬁrst range of bS²(0, n−14n−3) is absolutely
identical to n²{6, 7, 8}, and so E opts for (2.2.3) in the case of bS²(0, 1n) and
for a sub integration level (2.3.2) whenever bS²[ 1n , n−14n−3) holds. Continuing
with bS²( n−14n−3 , 13) leads by the comparison of (2.2.2) and (2.3.2) to the the
same boundary of n−32n−3 as before, which will even be greater than 13 , result-
ing in a sub-integration (2.3.2) for the whole interval of bS²( n−14n−3 , 13). As
there exist no alternatives to a zero proﬁt along (2.2.1) the entrant will sub
integrate (2.3.2) for bS²[13 , n−32n−1) either and determine a single integration
as a rational strategy for bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12) (2.3.1).
Combining these results for diﬀerent numbers of stages leads to the follow-
ing conclusion: For 3 ≤ n ≤ 4 E will full integrate (2.2.3) for bS²(0, n−14n−1)
and single integrate (2.3.1) for bS²[ n−14n−1 , 12). For all other numbers of stages,
namely n ≥ 5, the entrant will run a full integration (2.2.3) only for bS²(0, 1n),
in a range of bS²[ 1n , n−32n−1) E will decide for a sub integration (2.3.2) and in a
scenario of bS²[ n−32n−1 , 12) the only proﬁt maximizing strategy will be a single
integration, following (2.3.1).
Last we have to include the alternatives (3.1) and (3.2) from the third case.
For n ≤ 8 we have only to compare (3.1) with (2.3.1). It can easily be shown
that a proﬁt of 12(1 − bS) from (2.3.1) will be greater than 12(3bS − 1) for
bS < 12 , which will always be fulﬁlled in a demand-side dominated scenario.
In the case of n > 8 there arise the two alternatives of a sub-integration
(2.3.2) and a single integration (2.3.1). Therefore we attain for bS²(13 , n−32n−1)
a boundary of n−13+2n , which will be greater than n−32n−1 . Consequently E will
always decide for a sub-integration within bS²(13 , n−32n−1). In the range of
bS²[ n−32n−1 ,
1
2) the situation is absolutely symmetrical to n ≤ 8, in which we
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had already shown that a single integration along (2.3.1) will be more prof-
itable than strategy (3.1) for bS < 12 . Thus cases (3.1) and (3.2) will not
change the results that arose from the comparison of the two subcases 2.2
and 2.3 and so we proofed proposition 2.
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